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A number of papers have empirically investigated the rational addiction model proposed by Becker 
and Murphy (1988) by using data on different harmful drugs; but also activities independent of a 
biological or pharmaceutical dependency have been analysed, such as cinema. The purpose of this 
paper is to extend previous works on cinema demand by including two addictive consumption 
goods, cinema and television. To this aim a panel-data GMM methodology is used to estimate a 
dynamic model of double rational addiction as proposed by Bask and Melkersonn (2004) using a 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Dynamics have revealed to be very important for the explanation of individual behaviour in 
many empirical specifications. Hence, it seems natural to model the demand for addictive goods 
using a model which allows linkages of consumption over time. Becker and Murphy’s (1988) 
rational addiction model explains the consumption of addictive goods as a specific dynamic human 
capital accumulation process. Whatever the origin of addiction (pharmacological or a 
psychological), the framework used to deal with habit formation (endogeneity of preferences or 
shadow prices) and the assumption about consumer behaviour (rationality or myopia), the key 
feature of this model is the deterministic impact of past consumption on present behaviour. People 
are hooked into addiction and consumption follows a predictable optimal path. 
Although this model has been empirically investigated by a number of studies (McCain, 
1979, 1995; Villani, 1992; Abbé-Deccarraux, 1994; Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 1996), only 
few authors have analysed cinema demand (Cameron, 1999; Dewenter and Westermann, 2005; 
Sisto and Zanola, 2004). The first two studies applied the Becker and Murphy’s (1988)’s rational 
addiction model to a single country, respectively UK and Germany, failing to provide support for 
all the predictions of the rational addiction models. By contrast, Sisto and Zanola (2004) extend 
previous works by analysing a panel of thirteen European countries. Results provide strong 
evidence in favor of a model of cinema demand that emphasizes the role of past and future 
consumption in current consumption.  
Despite these interesting findings, however, new useful insight could be provided 
incorporating into econometric analysis the relationship between consumption of cinema and 
television. First, if cinema and television are important substitutes (or complements), then a 
correctly specified cinema demand equation must include television. Otherwise, the estimated 
coefficients of the included variables may be biased, depending, as usual, on the relationship 
between the included and excluded variables. Secondly, models that include multiple addictive 
goods may offer useful policy guidance to evaluate the impact of public interventations since it is 
not sufficient to consider the consumption of different addictive goods independently (Decker and 
Scwartz, 2000; Palacios-Huerta, 2003). 
The purpose of this paper is to extend previous works on cinema demand by including two 
addictive consumption goods, cinema and television. The idea of specific human capital 
accumulation in cinema consumption underlying the rational addiction approach is extended by 
allowing tv consumption to reinforce the movie stock (in the case of a complementary effect) or to 
depreciate it (if substitution effect emerges). To this aim a panel-data GMM methodology is used to 
estimate a dynamic model of double rational addiction as proposed by Bask and Melkersonn (2004)   3
using a sample of monthly time- and cross-sectional series covering the 20 Italian regions over the 
period 2000-2002. 
The proceeding of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. 
Data are described in Section 3. The econometric methodology  is shown in Section 4. Section 5 
summarises the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical model 
 
Following Becker and Murphy’s rational addiction theory, a consumer is said to be addicted 
if an increase in past consumption leads to an increase in present consumption ceteris paribus. This 
type of behaviour involved reinforcement, as an increase in past level of consumption increases the 
marginal utility for present consumption, and tolerance, as the satisfaction from a given level of 
consumption is lower when past level is greater (Bask and Melkersson, 2004).  
Although tolerance appears to be a reasonable assumption in the case of harmful goods 
(alcohol, tobacco, drugs, and so on), as a rational addicted consumer would discount the harmful 
effect of future addiction, it is more difficult to understand how it works in the case of harmless 
goods, such as the case of cinema consumption. However, it’s well known that cinema is a time 
intensive activity. Hence, the optimal path of cinema consumption could increase at diminishing 
rates as opportunity costs of going to cinema are expected to increase with age, due to the cost of 
time and the access to less time consuming rival opportunities, such as television consumption.  In 
fact, television viewing provides the possibility for different activities beside it and, furhermore, it 
offers some competitive advantags like comfort, convenience, privacy toghether with a potentially 
higher variety and quality of supplied programs (Cameron, 1990; Férnandez-Blanco and Banos-
Pino, 1997; Dewenter and Westermann, 2005). 
The Becker and Murphy’s model of addiction considers only one addictive good and one 
non-addictive good. In what follows we extend this basic model by including two addictive goods, 
rather than one addictive, along with one non-addictive good (Bask and Melkersson, 2004). 
Relaxing separability by allowing utility in each period to depend on consumption in the current 
and previous periods (Becker et al., 1994), a concave utility function at time t may be defined as: 
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where  Ct and At are respectively the consumption of two addictive goods; Yt  is  the 
consumption of non-addictive good; and et represents all the other factors affecting individual’s 
utility. Assuming a constant rate of time preference, σ, a constant price of the non-addictive good,   4
treated as numeraire, and perfect capital markets, the intertemporal decision of the individuals 
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where r is the constant real interest rate; Pc and Pa are the prices of the two addictive goods; 
and A0 is the initial value of assets.  
A standard technique used in literature to derive demand equations is to approximate the 
instantaneous utility function in the neighbourhood of steady-state by a quadratic function in the 
arguments. Assuming a rate of time preference equal to the market interest rate, one can derive the 
following difference equation:  
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where the θ’s are parameters which depend on the underlying preferences. Equation (3) 
nests different behaviours (Bask and Melkersson, 2004). Since a good is addictive if and only if an 
increase in past consumption leads to an increase in current consumption, a zero value of both θ1 
and  θ4 implies a non-addicted consumer. Testing for rational addiction is testing for forward 
looking behaviour. An addicted but myopic consumer is not farsighted, according to a simply 
backward looking consumer decision, while a rational addicted consumer takes into account 
consequences of past, current and future information. The rational model implies that coefficients 
on future consumption should have the same sign as coefficients on lagged consumption (the sign 
differ only by the term δ).  
 
3.  Data 
 
This section provides a brief description of the data sets used in this paper. The data consists 
of aggregate regional monthly time series from January 2000 to December 2002 for eighteen of the 
twenty Italian regions. In particular, the theoretical framework is investigated using the following 
variables. 
   5
(i)  Cinema demand: cinema demand, adm, is captured by the number of tickets sold in one 
month divided by population size. The data are obtained from Eropean Cinema Yearbook published 
by Mediasalles and Lo spettacolo in Italia published by SIAE. 
 
(ii)  Television consumption: the identification of an appropriate measure of television 
consumption is a difficult task. Previous empirical researches use very different strategies to deal 
with this issue. Cameron (1986) uses the number of colour licenses; Cameron (1990) defines a log 
dummy time trend to account for private television channels introduction; Fernandez-Blanco and 
Banos-Pino (1997) employ a dummy variable to model the introduction of regional television 
channels in Spain; Macmillan and Smith (2001) adopt the number of licenses for households to 
capture the effect of tv-set introduction on post-war cinema admissions. However, all these 
strategies appear to be imperfect measures of tv consumption and, consequently, empirical analyses 
are likely to be biased. In fact, inclusion of dummy variables could not fully capture either changes 
in tv ownership nor in quality/variety of television programming through the availability of more 
private or regional channels. The use of television licenses is also problematic. First, licenses are 
paid only on the first tvset owned so that this measure substantially underestimate the number of 
total household tvsets existing. Secondly, it does not provide any valid measure of consumption. A 
way to overcome some of these limits is to use tv audience. Hence, in order to check for a common 
habit accumulation process between cinema and tv, we use public and commercial television
1 prime 
time movie audience, tv, calculated as the monthly number of tv movie spectators divided by 
population size. Data are obtained from Auditel data elaboration published by Media Consultants. 
 
(iii)  Prices: price of admission to cinemas, p, is the ticket price at box-office.
2 The variable is the 
average expense per film-goer, which is the ratio between the monthly total regional receipts and 
the monthly number of film-goers, according to the data supplied by Mediasallers and SIAE 
publications. One would expect that the cinema demand is negatively related to the ticket price. 
However, in our case the elasticity of cinema admission with respect to price variations may not be 
overinterpreted due to the difficulty to exactly capture price variations when using monthly data 
(Dewenter and Westermann, 2005). By contrast, a pecuniary measure of tv price is difficult to 
define. In fact, Italian television owners have a virtually zero marginal costs for movie consumption 
as the license cost must be incurred whether or not the television set is used. Hence, television 
movie price is assumed to be an unmeasurable variable compressed in the error term.  
                                                           
1 RAI and the two major commercial broadcasting networks (Mediaset and La Sette). 
2 Due to the lack of information, we cannot take account of a second component of price – the cost of other activities 
which are gradually becoming essential to cinema attendance – for a description of which see Fernández Blanco and 
Baños Pino (1997).   6
 
(iv)  Other Factors: disposable per capita income and number of screens are other important 
factors affecting cinema demand (Macmillan and Smith, 2001; Sisto and Zanola, 2004). However, 
since monthly observations prevent us from taking account of these variables, the effects of them on 
cinema consumption  is partially captured by regional dummies. 
 
All monetary variables are deflated at 1995 price level by CPI index. Descriptive statistics are 




4.  Empirical Methodology 
 
In order to apply the theoretical framework of previous section, equation (3) can be specified 
by noting whether cinema consumption is affected (or not) to tv consumption and the evaluating the 
following equations: 
 
t i t i t i t t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i
tv tv tv p adm adm adm
tv p adm adm adm
p adm adm adm
, 1 , 6 , 5 1 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
, , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
, , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
ε α α α α α α α
ε α α α α α
ε α α α α
+ + + + + + + =
+ + + + + =
+ + + + =
+ − + −
+ −
+ −
     (4) 
 
where subscripts i and t stand respectively for the region and the period (month) considered 
and  t i, ε  is the error term.  
The direct estimation of equation (4) may give rise to some misleading results and some 
caution is necessary. First step in the analysis is to test wheter data can be pooled. Following 
Levaggi and Zanola (2003), F-tests are performed on the null hypothesis that the coefficients for 
each variable in equation (6) are the same for each year. Results are reported in table 2. The null 




Next step is to check for stationarity of the variables included in the model. In order to 
determine the presence of panel unit root we apply a battery of tests running the IPS t-bar tests (Im 
et al., 2003) and the Levin-Lin-Chu test (Levin, Lin and Chu, 2002), including a heterogeneous time 
trend in each specification.    7
[TABLE 3] 
 
Although results in Table 3 seem to strictly reject the null hypothesis of nonstationary for all 
the variables of the model, in some cases the findings of these unit root tests has proved to be very 
sensitive to the specification of the number of lags and time trend. Banjery (1999) showed that both 
IPS and Levin-Lin-Chu tests suffered from low power and failed to distinguish between I(0) and 
I(1). Visual inspection of each variable suggests a strong presence of  seasonality, inducing us to 
include monthly dummy variables to prevent our estimates from spurious regressions. Therefore, 
equation (4) is estimated in first differences, introducing eleven monthly dummies to check for  
seasonality, as follows: 
 
t i t i t i t t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i
tv tv tv p adm adm adm
tv p adm adm adm
p adm adm adm
, 1 , 6 , 5 1 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
, , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
, , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 ,
ε α α α α α α α
ε α α α α α
ε α α α α
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆
+ − + −
+ −
+ −
   (5) 
 
where ∆ is the first difference operator. 
 
5.  Results 
 
Taking first differences will induce a first-order moving average process into the transformed 
residuals (Arellano, 1989). Hence, in order to get consistent estimates we instrument endogenous 
variables (past and future consumption of dependent variable) with several lagged and leda levels of 
ticket price variable. Due to over-identification, we adopt the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) which is proved to be an appropriate method to get a consistent estimator when the number 
of instruments is higher than exogenous variables, as is the case here (Hamilton, 1995). The GMM 
estimators have the further advantage that we do not have to rely on the restrictive assumption of 
independent variables being strictly exogenous. Thus, independent variables may instead be 
assumed to be predetermined or allowed to be endogenous (Heinesen, 2004).  Instruments validity 
is checked using the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions (Sargan, 1958; Hensen, 1982). 




Column 2 reports the results of the standard Becker and Murphy’s (1988) model of addiction 
which considers only one addictive good and one non-addictive good. Results provide a strong   8
evidence that cinema consumption conforms to a rational addiction hypothesis. Both the 
coefficients on past and future consumption are positive and significantly different from zero, so 
that past and future changes significantly impact present consumption. Furthermore, we also notice 
that α1 > α2 as expected. This finding may support the hypothesis that cinema is a time consuming 
activity. In fact, the existence of increasing opportunity cost related to age, together with the access 
to less time consuming leisure activities, decreases the impact of future consumption, so that the 
coefficient is positive, but smaller than that associated to past consumption. Also the price 
coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero. The short-run price elasticity, measured 
at sample means
3, is –0.37 that is rather small than those obtained in comparable studies of rational 
addictive products (Dewenter, 2003). The long-run price elasticity is –0.80 which is about twice the 
short-run elasticity. Hence, as predicted by Becker et sl. (1994), in the long-run price changes do 
influence consumption much more than in the short-run. 
The second specification includes present tv movie consumption. The third column of Table 4 
shows the results of this specification. Also here, both past and future cinema consumption seems to 
affect present consumption. Thus, this outcome confirms the hypothesis of rational behaviour. This 
specification also provides evidence on the relationship between cinema consumption and tv movie 
consumption. The effect of tv movie consumption is positive and statistically significant. This is 
taken as evidence that, cinema and tv consumption are complements. The short-run and the long-
run elasticities are similar to the previous specification, respectively –0.42 and –0.94. 
Finally, column 4 of Table 4 shows the results of the most general specification, which 
includes both past and future tv movie consumption as explanatory variables (Bask and Melkersson, 
2004). To check for possible endogeneity of tv movie consumption a C-test has been computed for 
both past and future tv movie consumption. Findings suggest the endogeneity of past tv variable. 
Hence, this variable has been instrumented with lead and past levels of cinema price, as a positive 
(negative) correlation between these two variables is expected to exist to the extent that tv movie 
consumption proves to be a complement (substitute) of cinema going. Results are reported in 
column 5. Again, past and future cinema consumption are significant and positively related to 
present cinema consumption. Moreover, despite the inclusion of past and future tv movie 
consumption findings are still consistent with the evidence that cinema and tv consumption are 
complements. Finally, the short-run and the long-run elasticities display values that are in the range 
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η , where 2 , 1 λ are the characteristic roots and c and  p are the sample means (Dewenter, 
2003).   9
of estimates found internationally (Fernández Blanco and Baños Pino, 1997; Dewenter and 
Westermann, 2003). 
In order to better qualify our results, it may  be interesting to discriminate between weekday 
and  tv movie consumption. In fact, during weekend a partial substitution effect between tv movie 
and cinema consumption is likely to exist due to a different tv movie programming targeted on 
older consumers. 




Accounting for potential endogeneity of tv movie consumption (column 3), estimated 
coefficients show evidence in favour of a substitution relationship. Both lag and lead value of tv 
movie consumption exhibit a negative impact on current cinema demand while the coefficients 
associated with present tv movie consumption does not appear to be statistically significant at all 
common level. As usual, long-run price elasticity exceeds short-run price elasticity. 
Results from Table 6 displays the relationship between weekday tv movie consumption. The 
coefficients are similar to those estimated in table 4. Again, the presence of a common habit stock 
accumulation suggests that an increase in weekday tv movie consumption stimulates higher appetite 




However, a word of caution must be used in interpreting these results. In fact, the strength of 
this finding is somewhat weakened by the procedure used to deal with ticket prices. Since data are 
aggregated, prices are built as yearly average admission costs which prevent us from capturing price 
variation across different days and categories of purchasers. Analogously, the typical seasonal trend 
registered in box office revenue cannot be captured using annual data.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to assess whether cinema demand may be defined as a 
rational addicted behaviour. To this aim a panel-data GMM methodology is used to estimate a 
dynamic model of double rational addiction as proposed by Bask and Melkersonn (2004) using a 
sample of monthly time- and cross-sectional series covering the 20 Italian regions over the period 
2000-2002.  Results provide strong evidence in favor of a model of cinema demand that emphasizes   10
the role of past and future consumption on current consumption.While at first sight these results 
seem to be in contrast with empirical findings of economic literature since television is expected to 
be one of the main causes of cinema consumption decrease during the seventy, however, our 
estimates are not so surprising since it is likely that tv movie consumption could both reduce time 
available for cinema consumption (substitution effect) and increase the appetite for cinema 
consumption (complementary effect).   
However, further investigation is still required. In particular, a promising direction for future 
research might be to explore individual rather than aggregated data in order to capture price 
variation across different days and categories of purchasers. 
   11
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adm  Regional monthly cinema ticket sold  
per capita 
 
S.I.A.E., Lo spettacolo in Italia (2001); 
Mediasalles, European  Cinema Yearbook 
(2001-2003); 
Istat, Statistiche demografiche (2000-2002) 
 
0.146 0.094  0.011  0.532
p  Regional monthly average cinema ticket 
price at 1995 price levels 
 
S.I.A.E., Lo spettacolo in Italia (2001); 
Mediasalles, European  Cinema Yearbook 
(2001-2003); 
 
4.558 0.600  2.952  6.728
tv  Regional average prime time movies 
audience 
 
Media Consultants, AUDITEL data 
elaboration 
0.084 0.062  0.062  0.310  14
Table 2.   Testing pooling restrictions 
 
 




















Notes: for testing the hypothesis of pooling the following augmented models have been 
estimated: 
 
ADMi,t = β0 + β1 PADMi,t + Σβ1i DY* PADMi,t + β2 TVi,t + Σβ2i DY* TVi,t + β3 ΣDY + εi,t,  (6) 
 
by adding T-1 monthly dummy for each variable that take the value 1 if observation 
belongs to the monthconsidered. The F test is performed on the coefficient of these 
variables.   15
Table 3.   Unit root tests for panel 
 
 
Variable t-bar  p-value Trend 
adm
1  -2.463 0.071  Yes 
p
 1  -2.819 0.001  Yes 
tv
1  -3.416 0.000  Yes 
adm
2  -0.3699 0.024  Yes 
p
 2  -0.3492 0.000  Yes 
tv
2  -0.6515 0.000  Yes 
 
Notes: 
1 Im-Pesaran-Shin panel unit root test (2003). 
2 Levin-Lin-Chu test (2002). Both tests 
involve the null hypothesis that each series has a unit roots against the alternative hypothesis that 
the series have different persistence. Moreover, while the Im-Pesaran-Shin test allows for 
heterogeneity in estimated coefficients and the null is tested using the average of the t-ratios for 
each time series, the Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test assumes homogeneous coefficients. A linear 
trend is included in both test to allow for trend stationarity. 
   16














































































R-square 0.9098  0.9110  0.9124  0.9021 
 C test for tv (t-1)  -  -  2.807***  - 
 C test for tv (t+1)  -  -  0.851  - 
ηs  -0.3728  -0.4250 -0.4133 -0.5287 
ηl  -0.79621  -0.9367 -0.8471 -1.0266 
 
Notes: Variables are in first-difference to eliminate the common linear trend. Standard error in 
parenthesis. (a) Becker and Murphy rational addiction model; (b) inclusion of current tv audience;  
(c) inclusion of both past and future tv audience treated as exogenous regressors; (d) only past tv 
audience is treated as endogenous. Each GMM estimates use cinema ticket prices (from t-3 to t-13 
and from t+3 to t+13) as instruments for endogenous variables. Each regression includes 11 
monthly dummies (not in first difference) to capture seasonality, which estimates exhibit a 
significant negative impact to cinema demand. Moreover, their coefficient has not been reported to 
save space. C test is a difference in Sargan test based on the null of full exogeneity of instruments 
checked. 
*/**/*** represents, respectively, significance coefficient at 0.01/0.05/0.10.   17

























































R-square 0.9119  0.9092  0.8973 
 C test for week(t-1)  -  1.632  - 
 C test for week(t+1)  -  6.337**  - 
λs  -0.5364 -0.6123  -0.7042 
λl  -1.2880 -1.6334  -2.1960 
 
N.B. week is measured as average monthly holiday prime-time movie audience (Saturday, Sunday 
and international holiday (Christmas and Easter holiday, 6 January, 25 April, 1 May, 15 August, 
Halloween and All Saint, 8 December)  
 
Notes: Variables are in first-difference to eliminate the common linear trend. Standard error in 
parenthesis. (a) Becker and Murphy rational addiction model with the inclusion of current tv 
audience;  (b) inclusion of both past and future tv audience treated as exogenous regressors; (c) 
only future tv audience is treated as endogenous, (d) both past and future tv audience are treated as 
endogenous.  Each GMM estimates use cinema ticket prices (from t-3 to t-13 and from t+3 to 
t+13) as instruments for endogenous variables. Each regression includes 11 monthly dummies (not 
in first difference) to capture seasonality, which estimates exhibit a significant negative impact to 
cinema demand. Moreover, their coefficient has not been reported to save space. C test is a 
difference in Sargan test based on the null of full exogeneity of instruments checked. 
2 p-value in parenthesis. 
*/**/*** represents, respectively, significance coefficient at 0.01/0.05/0.10.   18

























































R-square 0.9101  0.9120  0.8971 
 C test for daily(t-1)  -  5.046**  - 
 C test for daily(t+1)  -  0.597  - 
λs  -0.3752 -0.4045  -0.5294 
λl  -0.8219 -0.8192  -1.0688 
 




Notes: Variables are in first-difference to eliminate the common linear trend. Standard error in 
parenthesis. (a) Becker and Murphy rational addiction model with the inclusion of current tv 
audience;  (b) inclusion of both past and future tv audience treated as exogenous regressors; (c) 
only past tv audience is treated as endogenous.  Each GMM estimates use cinema ticket prices 
(from t-3 to t-13 and from t+3 to t+13) as instruments for endogenous variables. Each regression 
includes 11 monthly dummies (not in first difference) to capture seasonality, which estimates 
exhibit a significant negative impact to cinema demand. Moreover, their coefficient has not been 
reported to save space. C test is a difference in Sargan test based on the null of full exogeneity of 
instruments checked. 
3 p-value in parenthesis 
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